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The Door Opens Wider:
The Rights of Non-Biological
Parents to Claim Custody Just
Expanded
James J. McGinnis*
Charles V. Crowe**
Andrew B. McClintock***
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2013, Susan Hill and Amy Burnett exchanged
wedding rings in North Carolina. Though same-sex marriage was not
yet legal in most states (North Carolina included), Hill and Burnett
moved forward to live together as spouses and began making plans to
grow their family. Later in 2013, Burnett began trying to become
pregnant. Both women contributed to the cost of the procedures
designed to promote pregnancy and, in 2014, Burnett became pregnant
with twin girls.1
During Burnett’s pregnancy, Hill attended birthing classes,
purchased items for the nursery, and took part in other sundry tasks
that ordinarily precede the birth of children. In late 2014, Hill was
present when Burnett gave birth to two baby girls and the parties met

*Partner, Warner Bates. Auburn University (B.A., 1979); Mercer University School of Law
(J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Warner Bates. Mercer University (B.A., 2006); Mercer University School of
Law (J.D., 2010). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Associate, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.A., 2012); University of Georgia
School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Hill v. Burnett, 349 Ga. App. 260, 261–62, 825 S.E.2d 617, 619 (2019).
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with an adoption attorney shortly thereafter to discuss Hill adopting
the children (although no adoption was ultimately finalized).2
The parties continued to live together for nearly two more years,
during which time Hill helped care for the children, provided clothing
and necessities for the children, and developed a bond with the
children. The women agreed that Hill would be called “Momma,” and
Burnett gave Mother’s Day cards to Hill.3
In June 2016, the women’s relationship ended, and Burnett and the
children moved out of the parties’ residence. During this time, Burnett
continued to send Hill photographs of the children and referred to Hill
as “Momma.” Later that year, Hill filed suit in the Superior Court of
Cobb County, Georgia seeking legitimation and establishment of
custody and parenting rights. Since no legal basis existed for an unwed
parent to claim custodial rights to a child who was not their biological
offspring, Hill pled her case on theories of implied contract, promissory
estoppel, and constitutional rights.4
The trial court dismissed Hill’s action for lack of standing as Hill was
neither a biological parent of the children, nor an adopted parent of the
children. The trial court also sanctioned Hill by ordering her to pay
Burnett’s attorney’s fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a)5 which
provides:
[R]easonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
shall be awarded to any party against whom another party has
asserted a claim, defense, or other position with respect to which
there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law
or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would
accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.6

Though the attorney’s fee award was reversed in part on appeal, Hill
had no choice but to live with the trial court’s ruling that she lacked any
standing to petition for custodial rights to children she helped raise and
who had once called her “Momma.”7 Such was the case for numerous
other non-traditional parents at the time who found themselves on the
receiving end of Georgia’s often harsh child custody laws. However, it

2. Id.
3. Id. at 262, 825 S.E.2d at 619.
4. Id.
5. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (2021).
6. Hill, 349 Ga. App. at 260–61, 825 S.E.2d at 618–19.
7. See Id. (reversing in part an attorney’s fee award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) as
appellant presented a justiciable issue when seeking to establish standing and gain
custody and parenting time/visitation).
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was the hope of many Georgia legal advocates and legislators that this
would soon change.
As courts and state legislatures nationwide began to recognize the
need to accommodate modern family structures, many states began to
establish, either through the legislature or through the courts, an
avenue for individuals who have acted in a parental role to a child to
seek and obtain formal custodial or visitation rights to the child even
without a biological or other recognized legal relationship.
On July 1, 2019, Georgia joined many other states with the
enactment of the Adjudicated Equitable Caregiver statute.8 The statute
was sponsored by Chuck Efstration (R-Dacula) and passed by the
Georgia General Assembly in April 2019 by a vote of 152 to 3, with 15
not voting.9 The statute, which officially took effect on July 1, 2019,
permits a person who demonstrates an established parental role to
petition the court for a determination that they are an “equitable
caregiver” to the child; once that determination is made, the court may
award visitation or even custodial rights—and responsibilities—to the
equitable caregiver.10
II. WHAT IS THE ADJUDICATED EQUITABLE CAREGIVER ACT?
In brief, the Adjudicated Equitable Caregiver Act authorizes Georgia
Superior Courts to grant custody or visitation rights to third parties
who have acted in a dedicated parental role to a minor child, even
though they may not have a formal legal or biological relationship.11
Prior to its enactment, the right of custody was restricted to a few
specific classes of people. Legal parents—the parents of children born in
wedlock, and the biological fathers of children born out of wedlock who
have sought legitimation—are entitled to custody and to exercise
parental power over their minor children until and unless their
parental rights and relationship is terminated by the operation of law.12
Adoptive parents enjoy full parental and custodial rights once the
adoption process is complete, and the rights of the biological/former
parents are terminated.13 Certain close family members (grandparents,
great-grandparents, aunts, uncles, great-aunts, great-uncles, siblings,
and adoptive parents) are also statutorily authorized to seek custody
only upon a loss of parental power and a showing that the removal of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 (2021).
Ga. H.B. 543, Reg. Sess. (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2021).
Id.

986

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

custody from the legal parents is in the best interests of the children.14
Additionally, another statute commonly referred to as the “grandparent
visitation statute,”15 authorizes grandparents to file an original action
for visitation (but not custody) with a minor grandchild16 and
authorizes grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings of a minor
child to intervene and seek visitation rights where custody, termination
of parental rights, or visitation is already at issue in litigation.17
Legitimation, which is necessary for a biological parent who is not a
legal parent to pursue before they may seek custodial rights, is an
avenue available only to biological fathers by the express terms of
Georgia’s legitimation statute.18
As the modern family has evolved, and especially in the wake of the
Supreme Court of the United States’ decision legalizing same-sex
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges,19 serious cracks and gaps have begun
to appear in the coverage of the traditional custody framework
discussed above. Stepparents, for example, do not fall within the
categories of relatives that are permitted to seek custodial rights under
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 or visitation rights under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3; in the
absence of an adoption, which is not possible while both legal parents
retain their parental rights, a stepparent could be left with no
enforceable legal right to their stepchildren if something were to
happen to the legal parent spouse.20 Even if the stepparent had
maintained a dedicated and committed parental role to their stepchild
for the balance of the child’s life, divorce, or the death of the legal
parent spouse could deprive the stepparent entirely of any enforceable
right to see the child or maintain the relationship. Same-sex couples
faced similar risks: if only one partner had a biological relationship to
the child, the only established path for the non-biological parent to
obtain formal custodial or visitation rights was adoption. If for
whatever reason adoption was not possible, the non-biological parent
could be left without any legally cognizable relationship to the child if
something happened to the biological parent or the parents separated.

14. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2021).
15. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2018) (invalidated by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1).
16. Id. at § 19-7-3(b)(1)(A).
17. Id. at § 19-7-3(b)(1)(B).
18. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(b) (2021). See Hill, 349 Ga. App. 260, 825 S.E.2d 617
(assessing sanctions against female former same-sex partner for seeking to legitimate
child in absence of authority permitting her to do so).
19. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
20. See O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1, 19-7-3.
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The Equitable Caregiver Act represents an attempt to bridge that
gap, in that it permits any individual, regardless of biological
relationship, to seek custodial and visitation rights with a minor child
provided that they demonstrate standing under the criteria set forth in
the statute, which is discussed below.21 This provides an avenue for
those categories of caregivers discussed above—stepparents, same-sex
partners or spouses, and other close family members or friends who
may not fit into the traditional relationship roles contemplated under
Georgia’s previous custody framework—to formally protect their
relationships with the children they have raised and cared for as their
own.
III. HOW DOES THE ADJUDICATED EQUITABLE CAREGIVER ACT WORK?
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 sets forth the entire petition and procedural
framework for an individual seeking adjudication as an equitable
caregiver.22 The statute contemplates a two-part process. First, the
petitioner must establish standing by demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she has:
(1) Fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life;
(2) Engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(3) Established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child,
which relationship was fostered or supported by a parent of the child,
and such individual and the parent have understood, acknowledged,
or accepted that or behaved as though such individual is a parent of
the child;
(4) Accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the
child without expectation of financial compensation; and
(5) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or longterm emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between
such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child.23

In assessing the harm element of subsection (d)(5), the statute
further provides that the court should consider:
(1) Who are the past and present caretakers of the child;

21. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 19-7-3.1(d).
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(2) With whom has the child formed psychological bonds and the
strength of those bonds;
(3) Whether competing parties evidenced an interest in, and contact
with, the child over time; and
(4) Whether the child has unique medical or psychological needs that
one party is better able to meet.24

The statute provides that the initial pleading must be supported by
an affidavit attesting to these elements and alleging specific facts under
oath and provides that the respondent or defendant party “shall” file a
response affidavit along with their Answer.25
The court may hold a hearing on an expedited basis to determine
“undisputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of
standing” and, if the court is satisfied that the allegations are sufficient,
the petitioner may “proceed to [an] adjudication” of their equitable
caregiver status based upon the five factors set forth above.26 The
statute also permits the court to grant standing based upon the consent
of a child’s parents to the establishment of the equitable caregiver
relationship, or based upon a written agreement between the proposed
caregiver and the parent “indicating an intention to share or divide
caregiving responsibilities for the child.”27 Once the court determines a
petitioner has standing, the statute provides simply that “[t]he court
may enter an order as appropriate to establish parental rights and
responsibilities for such individual, including, but not limited to,
custody or visitation.”28
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Georgia’s legislature and higher courts have grappled with the
establishment of a constitutional framework to allow non-parents to
petition for visitation and custodial rights with minor children for more
than twenty-five years. The 1998 revisions to the grandparent visitation
statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3, provided three avenues for a grandparent to
seek visitation: (1) by filing an original action; (2) by intervening in
already-ongoing litigation regarding custody of the child; and (3) by
proceeding where the child has already been adopted by a blood relative

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at § 19-7-3.1(e).
Id. at § 19-7-3.1(b)(1)–(2).
Id. at § 19-7-3.1(b)(3)–(4).
Id. at § 19-7-3.1(f).
Id. at § 19-7-3.1(g).
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or stepparent.29 To be awarded visitation rights, the petitioning
grandparent merely had to prove “special circumstances which make
such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child.”30 In
its 1995 decision in Brooks v. Parkerson,31 the Georgia Supreme Court
found that standard constitutionally impermissible because the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal
Constitutions permit the state to invade the constitutional right of
parents to custody and control of their children, “only where the state
acts in its police power to protect the child’s health or welfare, and
where parental decisions in the area would result in harm to the
child.”32 As the court held, “even assuming grandparent visitation
promotes the health and welfare of the child, the state may only impose
that visitation over the parents’ objections on a showing that failing to
do so would be harmful to the child.”33
In its 2001 opinion in Clark v. Wade,34 the Georgia Supreme Court
set forth the constitutional standard applicable to custody disputes
between parents and third parties.35 The Clark opinion actually
addressed two consolidated appeals,36 both challenging the newly
established “best interest” standard enacted by the legislature to
replace the prior “parental unfitness” standard in custody disputes
between parents and third parties under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).37
Specifically, the amended statutory language at issue provided:

29. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 190, 454 S.E.2d 769, 770–71 (1995) (citing
former O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b)).
30. Id. at 191, 454 S.E.2d at 771.
31. Id. at 189, 454 S.E.2d at 769.
32. Id. at 193, 454 S.E.2d at 772.
33. Id. at 194, 454 S.E.2d at 773.
34. 273 Ga. 587, 544 S.E.2d 99 (2001).
35. Id. at 587–88, 544 S.E.2d at 100.
36. The first, Clark v. Wade (S00A1610), concerned a custody dispute between the
father and the maternal grandparents after the parents divorced and the mother was
arrested for a drug violation. The father petitioned for sole custody, and the grandparents
intervened. The trial court found that awarding custody to the grandparents was in the
best interests of the child but struck the “best interest” standard down as
unconstitutional and awarded custody to the father. The second, Driver v. Raines
(S00A2014), was an appeal from a custody dispute between an unwed father and the
maternal grandparents, in which the trial court found O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1)
unconstitutional for failing to articulate “any standard” and “allow[ing] the factfinder to
substitute its subjective judgment about the child’s best interest for the parent’s decision,
thus depriving parents of their liberty and privacy interests in the care, custody, and
management of their children.” Id. at 588–89, 544 S.E.2d at 101.
37. Id. at 587–88, 544 S.E.2d at 100 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1)).
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[I]n any action involving the custody of a child between the parents
or either parent and a third party limited to grandparent, greatgrandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive
parent, parental power may be lost by the parent, parents, or any
other person if the court hearing the issue of custody, in the exercise
of its sound discretion and taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case, determines that an award of custody to
such third party is for the best interest of the child or children and
will best promote their welfare and happiness. There shall be a
rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the child or
children for custody to be awarded to the parent or parents of such
child or children, but this presumption may be overcome by a
showing that an award of custody to such third party is in the best
interest of the child or children. The sole issue for determination in
any such case shall be what is in the best interest of the child or
children.38

The Georgia Supreme Court in Wade explained that the “[a]doption
of this new standard shift[ed] the trial court’s inquiry solely from the
current fitness of the biological parent to raise the child to include
consideration of the child’s interest in a safe, secure environment that
promotes his or her physical, mental, and emotional development.”39
Relying in part on the rationale of its prior opinion in Brooks, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Clark reiterated that under the Georgia and
United States Constitutions, “[p]arents have a constitutional right . . .
to the care and custody of their children,”40 which is “a fiercely guarded
right . . . that should be infringed upon only under the most compelling
circumstances.”41 Implicit in this right are three presumptions: “(1) the
parent is a fit person entitled to custody, (2) a fit parent acts in the best
interest of his or her child, and (3) the child’s best interest is to be in the
custody of a parent.”42 Thus, “the state may interfere with a parent’s
right to raise his or her child only when the state acts to protect the
child’s health or welfare and the parent’s decision would result in harm
to the child.”43
The required showing of harm to the child serves to rebut the
presumptions in favor of parental custody and to authorize the state to
38. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).
39. Wade, 273 Ga. at 593, 544 S.E.2d at 104.
40. Id. at 596, 544 S.E.2d at 106.
41. Id. at 596–97, 544 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting In re Suggs, 249 Ga. 365, 367, 291
S.E.2d 233, 235 (1982)).
42. Id. at 593, 544 S.E.2d at 104.
43. Id. at 597, 544 S.E.2d at 106 (citing Brooks, 265 Ga. at 194, 454 S.E.2d at 773).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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constitutionally interfere with the parent’s exclusive right to custody
and control of the child.44
In upholding the newly enacted language of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1),
the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the legislature had avoided
the constitutional infirmities that were present in the statute at issue
in the seminal Supreme Court of the United States case Troxel v.
Granville,45 noting that “[f]irst, OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) expressly limits
third parties who may seek custody to a specific list of the child’s closest
relatives, including an adoptive parent. Second, the statute defers to
the fit parent’s decision on custody by establishing a rebuttable
presumption in favor of parental custody.”46 Ultimately, the court held
that the best interest standard applicable to custody disputes between
third parties and parents requires:
[T]hat the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the child will suffer physical or emotional harm if custody were
awarded to the biological parent. Once this showing is made, the
third party must then show that an award of custody to him or her
will best promote the child’s welfare and happiness.47

Notably, subsection (d)(5) of the Equitable Caregiver Act appears to
incorporate the harm standard enunciated in Wade and other lines of
authority addressing custodial disputes between parents and
nonparents.48 The standard incorporated into the current version of the
grandparent visitation statute requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that “the health or welfare of the child would be
harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the best interests of the
child would be served by such visitation,”49 and the standard approved
by the court in Wade and incorporated into the third-party custody
statute requires that parental power be lost and “that the third party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer
physical or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the biological
parent . . . . [and] that an award of custody to him or her will best
promote the child’s welfare and happiness.”50 However, the Equitable
44. Id. at 598, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
45. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
46. Wade, 273 Ga. at 597, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
47. Id. at 599, 544 S.E.2d at 108.
48. See, e.g., Patten v. Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 140, 816 S.E.2d 633, 634 (2018) (following
Brooks v. Parkerson and holding O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d), a subsection of the grandparent
visitation statute, unconstitutional for failing to require a showing of harm to the child if
visitation is not granted).
49. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1).
50. Wade, 273 Ga. at 599, 544 S.E.2d at 108. See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).
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Caregiver Act does not clearly specify whether the focus of the harm
inquiry is on the denial of the continued relationship with the caregiver,
or on harmful conduct by the parent, or both.51 In other words, insofar
as the cases could be read to suggest a distinction in the constitutional
standard applicable to visitation disputes (Brooks and Patten) and that
applicable to custody disputes (Wade), there may be some questions as
to whether or not the harm test set forth in the Equitable Caregiver
Act—which contemplates both visitation and custodial awards to third
parties—satisfies the applicable constitutional standards.
V. THE IMPACTS OF THE EQUITABLE CAREGIVER ACT
The Georgia Court of Appeals has issued three opinions referencing
or deciding appeals under the Equitable Caregiver Act since its
enactment in 2019.
The first of these, Wallace v. Chandler,52 concerned a custody petition
filed in 2017 by foster parents seeking to establish custody of the foster
child placed with them in dependency proceedings. The foster parents,
the Chandlers, filed a petition stating that the child was deprived and
requested that they be awarded sole custody of the minor child. The
mother, who was incarcerated at the time of the filing, did not respond
or appear at the final hearing, and the trial court granted the petition
and awarded custody to the Chandlers. The mother then filed a motion
to set the final custody order aside, which was denied, and appealed
from the denial of the motion.53 Ultimately, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside on the
grounds that the Chandlers did not have standing to pursue custody in
the manner they sought to do so.54 As the court noted, “[i]n general,
third parties have no right to seek custody of a child whose parents
have not lost custody by one of the means established in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-1 or O.C.G.A. § 19-7-4 or have not been deemed unfit.”55 While
the legislature did provide for third parties to seek custody under
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1), foster parents are not one of the categories of
family members who are authorized to seek custody under that code
section.56 However, in discussing possible alternative means for third
parties to seek custody, the court of appeals specifically highlighted the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-3.1(d)(5), (e).
360 Ga. App. 541, 859 S.E.2d 100 (2021).
Id. at 541–42, 859 S.E.2d at 101–02.
Id. at 545, 859 S.E.2d at 104.
Id. at 543, 859 S.E.2d at 102.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).
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recent enactment of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 as providing a possible avenue
for non-relatives to seek and obtain custody of minors in their care.57
The first appeal from a substantive award under the Equitable
Caregiver Act was decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals on October
4, 2021, in Skinner v. Miles.58 The petitioner, Miles, filed an action
under the Equitable Caregiver Act against her former partner, Sarah
Skinner, seeking custody and visitation of two minor children. Skinner
and Miles had first adopted a child from Texas in 2009, but due to
Texas law prohibiting same-sex couples from adopting, only Skinner’s
name was listed on the adoption paperwork. The parties gave the child
Miles’ surname as a means of recognizing Miles’ role in the child’s life.
Shortly thereafter, Skinner became pregnant, and the child was born in
2010 and also given Miles’ surname as her middle name. The parties
lived together and shared responsibilities for care and activities with
the children, took the children on vacations and holidays together, and
Skinner provided financial support as well. The parties separated and
moved to different residences in 2015, but Miles continued to visit with
them, and they would stay at her house for scheduled visitation. In
2017, Skinner proposed a formal visitation arrangement, and after brief
litigation, the parties entered into a formal Visitation Arrangement.
Skinner married a new partner in 2018, and Miles filed an action under
the Equitable Caregiver Act shortly after it became effective in July
2019.59
Following a four-day bench trial, the trial court determined that
Miles had demonstrated standing, proven that she had “‘established a
strong bond with both minor children and that [she] had an ongoing
relationship with both children since [S. M. S.’s] adoption and [K. M.
S.’s] birth . . . .’ [and] found that if Miles was not granted equitable
caregiver status, the children would suffer long-term emotional
harm.”60 The court granted Miles’ petition to be adjudicated an
equitable caregiver, and Skinner appealed.61 On review, the court of
appeals held that the trial court had properly applied the statute to the
facts in determining standing based first upon the affidavits of the
parties and then upon the five factors set forth in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3.1(d).62 While Skinner claimed that “Miles did not establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the children will suffer physical or
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Wallace, 360 Ga. App. at 544–45, 859 S.E.2d at 103–04.
361 Ga. App. 764, 863 S.E.2d 578 (2021) (recons. denied Nov. 2, 2021).
Id. at 764–767, 863 S.E.2d at 580–582.
Id. at 766, 863 S.E.2d at 581.
Id.
Id. at 770, 863 S.E.2d at 583; See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(d).
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long-term emotional harm if the court did not grant Miles equitable
caregiver status,” the court of appeals found that “after considering the
factors listed in the statute for determining harm, the court concluded
that Miles demonstrated that the children would suffer physical or
long-term emotion[al] harm, and that continuing the relationship
between Miles and the children was in the children’s best interest.”63
Notably, Skinner does not appear to have challenged the
constitutionality of the statute. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling and denied Skinner’s motion for reconsideration on
November 2, 2021.64
The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled on a second challenge to a trial
court’s order under the Equitable Caregiver Act in Teasley v. Clark,65
issued on November 1, 2021. In Teasley, the minor child’s stepfather,
Clark, filed a Complaint against Teasley, the biological father, seeking
to be adjudicated an equitable caregiver and requesting an award of
joint legal and secondary physical custody after the child’s biological
mother, Stephanie Clark, passed away in a car accident. The evidence
in the record showed that the petitioner, Craig Clark, began dating the
child’s mother in 2010, when the child was a year old, then married
Stephanie Clark in 2013, and the three lived together in Georgia
following his discharge from the military in 2014. After the mother died
in a car accident in 2020, the child went to live with Teasley, his
biological father, but Clark continued to support the child and had
established a bond with him during their time living together. The trial
court entered an order adjudicating Clark as an equitable caregiver and
awarded him temporary visitation, and Teasley appealed.66
Teasley challenged the constitutionality of the statute, the propriety
of the court’s order of temporary visitation, and the court’s failure to
make specific findings of fact in its final order.67 On review, the court of
appeals determined that he had failed to preserve the constitutional
challenge for review because it was not raised at the trial court.68 The
court of appeals also ruled that Teasley’s challenge to the temporary
visitation award relied upon inapplicable authority,69 which predated
63. Id. at 769, 863 S.E.2d at 583.
64. Id. at 770, 863 S.E.2d at 583.
65. 361 Ga. App. 721, 865 S.E.2d 556 (2021).
66. Id. at 721–22, 865 S.E.2d at 557.
67. Id. at 722, 865 S.E.2d at 558.
68. Id.
69. Id. Teasley relied upon Land v. Wrobel, 220 Ga. 260, 138 S.E.2d 315 (1964),
wherein the Georgia Supreme Court held that the mother, rather than the grandmother,
was entitled to custody and control of a minor child after the custodial parent had died,
where there was no finding or showing that the mother was unfit. However, as the court
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the enactment of the Equitable Caregiver Act.70 The Equitable
Caregiver Act does, by its clear terms, authorize the trial court to make
an award of custody or visitation to an adjudicated equitable
caregiver.71 Finally, the court of appeals was unpersuaded by Teasley’s
claim that the trial court had erred by failing to make specific findings
of fact; while the statute does require that the court find by clear and
convincing evidence that the petitioner has satisfied the elements of
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(d), it does not require that additional specific
findings of fact be made.72
While there has been relatively little appellate activity concerning
the Equitable Caregiver Act since its enactment, it is clear it is being
used at the trial level, and stepparents and former same-sex partners
are successfully using it as intended to maintain relationships with
children with whom they have established bonded, loving parental
relationships even in the absence of a blood relationship. As the matters
of Hill and Wallace illustrate, these outcomes were simply not possible
under Georgia’s custodial framework before the enactment of the
Equitable Caregiver Act.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF THE EQUITABLE CAREGIVER ACT
At the time of this writing, a constitutional challenge to the
Equitable Caregiver Act is pending before the Georgia Supreme Court.
In an order dated September 1, 2021, the court of appeals transferred
the pending appeal in McAlister v. Clifton73 to the supreme court to
hear the matter as an issue of first impression.74 The appeal was
docketed in the supreme court on September 16, 2021, and oral
arguments are scheduled for January 18, 2022.75 Attorneys and parents
potentially seeking to avail themselves of the statute should be
attentive to the outcome of this pending appeal.

in Teasley stated, Land predated the enactment of the statute by more than fifty years.
Indeed, Land was decided at a time when habeas corpus proceedings were still proper
means by which to adjudicate custody disputes. But see O.C.G.A. § 19-9-23(c) (2019) (“The
use of a complaint in the nature of habeas corpus seeking a change of child custody is
prohibited.”).
70. Teasley, 361 Ga. App. at 722, 865 S.E.2d at 558.
71. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1.
72. Teasley, 361 Ga. App. at 723, 865 S.E.2d at 558. By contrast, the court noted that
the grandparent visitation statute does require that the trial court make specific written
findings of fact. See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1.
73. A21A1264. McAlister v. Clifton., Sept. 21, 2021.
74. Id.
75. McAlister v. Clifton, _ Ga. App. _, 867 S.E.2d 126 (2021).
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Additionally, it is worth noting that Georgia House Representative
Chuck Efstration (R-Dacula), an initial sponsor of the Equitable
Caregiver Act, proposed an amendment to the statute through House
Bill 216 during the 2021–2022 legislative session.76 Representative
Efstration’s proposed amendment would alter the operation of the
statute such that, in order to establish standing, the petitioner would
need to show that they had satisfied the five-part test set forth in
subsection (d) “within the five years immediately preceding the filing of
the initial pleading[.]”77 Further, the proposed amendment would add
subsection (k) to the end of the Act, which would provide that a party
granted custody as an adjudicated caregiver “shall be subject to having
his or her custodial rights to a child removed upon the finding by a
court that one or both parents are no longer a risk of causing physical
harm or long-term emotional harm to the child.”78 Representative
Efstration’s proposal was adopted by the Senate as part of the 2021–
2022 Senate Bill 86, which was generally an amendment to the Fair
Business Practices Act of 1975.79 The Senate version of the amendment
largely retained Representative Efstration’s revisions, including the
addition of subsection (k), but additionally included a caveat in
subsection (g) that the trial court’s order establishing parental rights
and responsibilities for the adjudicated equitable caregiver could not
order the payment of child support to the equitable caregiver.80 S.B. 86
was not sent to the Governor before the legislative session adjourned on
March 31, 2021. However, considering the scope of the proposed
revisions to the law, practitioners and aspiring equitable caregivers
would do well to remain apprised of any future legislative activity
relating to the Equitable Caregiver Act.
In the meantime, however, the Equitable Caregiver Act remains a
viable pathway for nontraditional parents and caregivers to establish
formal legal custodial relationships with minor children with whom
they have established bonded, dependent parental relationships, where
previously no such pathways existed. In short—it appears to be
working.

76. Ga. H.R. Bill 216, Reg. Sess. (2021) (unenacted). Chuck Efstration (R-Dacula) is
an initial sponsor of the Equitable Caregiver Act, along with co-sponsors Mary Margaret
Oliver (D-Decatur), Mike Wilensky (D-Dunwoody), and Bonnie Rich (R-Suwanee). Ga.
H.B. 543, Reg. Sess. (2019).
77. Ga. H.R. Bill 216, Reg. Sess. (2021) (unenacted).
78. Id.
79. Ga. S. Bill 86, Reg. Sess. (2021) (unenacted).
80. Id.

